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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyzes the technical and information management 
environment that United States Army heavy combat tactical units operate in and 
provides a solution for how the Army’s software development community can 
assist these units in managing multiple sources of information. The computer 
hardware, software applications and network infrastructure are examined within 
this context to illustrate the difficulty that lower level tactical units face in 
receiving, processing and redistributing information in an automated 
environment. The thesis describes some of the systemic reasons, not readily 
apparent to higher level operational units, as to why lower level tactical units 
struggle to keep pace with all of the information they received.  Platform-centric, 
stovepipe approaches have caused significant challenges for managing the flow 
of information to and from the tactical unit level.  In addition, the pushdown 
approach to information distribution does not adequately address how the 
terminal level units in the distribution process receive and synthesize information 
from multiple sources. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
It is apparent that the United States has become, arguably, the most 
productive and economically competitive country in the post Cold-War era. The 
chief contributors to this growth has been the broad approach by the U.S. 
commercial private sector, civilian public sector and the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) leveraging the power of computing, information and networking 
technology. By doing so, we have placed pressure on the research and 
development communities to constantly improve our collective bottom line. For 
the past twenty-five years, during the transition of the computer revolution into 
the information revolution, the DoD has taken advantage of efforts primarily 
driven by the commercial and civilian government sectors and applied the 
knowledge to military operational and tactical processes; with varying degrees of 
success. 
One area of concern the DoD is currently looking into is the ability to share 
information smartly over operational/tactical networks. To this end, the services 
have developed their own system of battlefield sensors, computers, applications 
and network infrastructure to communicate, manage operations planning and 
execution. However many of these tools were developed with specific tactical 
functions in mind. Each functional platform operates independent of others: 
integration for the purpose of sharing was an afterthought. Attempts to re-
engineer and fix this afterthought remain a prominent challenge for U.S. Army 
research and development community.   
As the U.S. Army develops better software tools to collect and manage 
information essential to higher level units, lower, tactical-level staffs are being 
overwhelmed with information they do not need, making it difficult to discern the 
essential elements. This can potentially result in the information they receive and 
process to be inaccurate, obscured, unnecessarily redundant or untimely. To 
prevent this from occurring, lower-level tactical units need mission planning tools 
that are tailored to their specific operational domain.  Development of information 
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management applications for tactical-level units will help the U.S. Army realize 
the potential gains that both the computer and information revolution have long 
promised.  
Computers have brought about critical changes in the everyday functions 
of our lives, from traffic management to commercial aircraft control functions. 
Thirty years ago we would not have imagined the possibility of commercial 
aircraft flying across the skies unmanned. Yet, because of embedded systems 
for flight control functions, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) for position 
feedback functions and onboard navigation systems integrating the position 
vector feedback into flight control functions for the aircraft, we know that 
automated flight is possible.  
This, as an example of the evolutionary changes in our environment, 
dictates that we, as both influencers of and functionaries within our environment, 
have to dramatically change how we view our environment if we are to leverage 
any advantage from the changes to it. Every documented industry success can 
be partially attributed to understanding the changing environment and early 
adaptation of the potential advantages resulting from those changes.  
1. Information Synthesis and Decisioneering 
Information synthesis and decisioneering are the ‘new frontier’ of the 
computer revolution. Synergy, as it relates to automation, is the art and science 
of leveraging multiple sources of information into better decisions 
administratively, strategically and operationally. It can also be described 
philosophically as the sum of the whole (of information) being greater than its 
parts. In this domain, the private sector may be ahead of both the government 
and the DoD. The reason for this may be the differences in expected benefits for 
corporations, public service institutions and military operations. Competition for 
the private sector can readily translate into bottom line results such as total 
geographic market share or gross revenue. 
For public institutions, the purpose of the institution is to provide a service 
to the community, and automation should result in cost savings and efficiency. 
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However, this can be difficult to quantify because many components of the 
institution can influence the cost of running it. By the time the institution realizes 
the gain from a cost saving automation project, the savings may have already 
been spent elsewhere. If analyzing the budget figures alone is supposed to 
provide the feedback of cost saving measures, then the results will likely be 
buried under budget increases of other areas. The more influences there are on 
a budget, the more difficult it is to determine if cost savings measures are 
creating any positive results. Competition is also defined differently. Public 
institutions may be competing with their own past performance or with the 
performance of previously elected leadership of the institution.  
2. The U.S. Army and Information Management 
Consider the U.S. Army, as an extension of the government and part of 
the military community.  Leveraging information for the military has its own 
challenges. Utilizing mobile network concepts to share information for planning 
and executing wartime operations is unique because ‘mobile’ implies wireless 
communications whereas for a civilian business ‘mobile’ often means virtual 
private networking and remote access. 
One of the military’s goals in recent years has been to trim costs. However 
it has to be balanced with others performance goals such as winning our nations 
wars, and conserving the lives of soldiers and the resources of the U.S. Army.  
How all of these performance objectives are measured is challenging and 
unclear. In addition, some of the objectives may conflict with one another. For 
example, smaller, lighter, faster deployed into a military action means lower cost 
for the operation, however it, also means increased risk to the deployed soldiers 
and possibly violating an important principle of war, namely Mass.  
Ultimately, what the DoD, and for the purpose of this thesis, the U.S. Army 
should be focusing on are the force multipliers to gain competitive advantages on 
the battlefield. The current philosophical approach the DoD is implementing this 
is called Network-Centric Warfare (NCW); a computer to network integration 
paradigm. Knowledge-Based Warfare (KBW) is the information integration 
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development process designed to approach a point of effective knowledge 
sharing and semi-automated decision making on the battlefield. A realistic goal 
for the DoD is to ensure every function specific computer platform operates on a 
common high-level architecture to ensure integration of the network and 
information scheme. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate through available resources 
that a need exists to develop software tools that allow lower-level units to access 
mission planning information as it is being developed. Specified tasks can be 
distributed more effectively by modifying how the messages are sent to lower-
level units from higher-level units. This thesis will also imply that a cornerstone 
component of network and knowledge based planning will be facilitating effective 
information sharing on tactical networks.  
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this research is focused on the mission planning processes 
of the U.S. Army. The intent is to analyze the logical and functional processes of 
the hierarchic communications scheme the U.S. Army uses in the past and 
illustrate the differences between these processes and processes that could be 
used as a combat multiplier.  
Some of the questions this study intends to answer are: How does the 
U.S. Army share information between units to achieve information synergy? 
What data objects, created by an information process, can be shared, with other 
units participating in an operation? What data object need to be modified during 
the sharing process? What data objects benefit from controlling access?  
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study reviews the current hardware, software and networking 
capabilities of the U.S. Army. The research also illustrates solutions the U.S. 
Army employs to solve networking, information management and 
communications problems. 
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The organization structure of the combat staffs at the brigade-level is 
analyzed to illustrate how information is produced and currently distributed. In 
order to identify better ways to communicate between echelons, issues are 
identified in the current process. The output of mission planning becomes the 
input of the Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) process.  
A review of available pertinent literature, the research will analyze and 
illustrate how the military employs technology to solve information management 
problems. This study analyzes current processes and offer solutions based on 
extending current information processes to the lowest units, which can 
tremendously benefit from shared information resources. The goal of this study is 
to argue the necessity for renewing interest in incorporating lower level tactical 
units into automated information processes, specifically for mission planning. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study incorporates a literature review of the current background of 
DoD studies in network-centric and knowledge-based warfare to ensure these 
issues are sufficiently addressed. Additionally, current U.S. Army organizational 
and technological structures are analyzed in order to define the solution that this 
Thesis suggests about the current technical capabilities of the U.S. Army. 
This study researches the current information distribution processes, used 
at tactical units at the brigade-level and below use to create a conceptual model 
to address the current shortcomings. An illustration of the shortcomings in the 
current model and a way of solving these shortcomings will be offered. 
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II. U.S. ARMY NETWORKING 
A. U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1. Functional 
To understand how the U.S. Army can achieve information superiority, an 
understanding of how the U.S. Army is organized and how it operates is needed. 
The U.S. Army is a hierarchical organization, sometimes struggling to identify 
itself by function, operation and task organization. Some of the organizational 
concepts have legacy connotations, not necessarily fitting into the dynamic 
structure of joint force operations and task organization. However, they do have 
relevance as container organizations for the lower units contained within them. 
There are many containers within the U.S. Army. Armies contain corps, who, in 
turn, contain divisions. However, in today’s operational environment, armies do 
not deploy as operational units and seldom do corps. They administratively track 
resources and personnel status, maintain facilities and real estate for training and 
advise operational commanders and national military advisors at the highest 
levels about what the deployable units need. Additionally, they support the 
maintenance and supply functions of their deployable sub-units. The functional 
structure begins at U.S. Army level. Armies generally contain two to three corps.   
A corps has a similar history and function to an U.S. Army in that it does 
not deploy forces directly but it contains forces according to what is called a 
Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). The primary difference between 
corps and armies is their historical inclination towards a service branch such as 
Artillery, Infantry or Transportation. Some corps has fostered relationships with 
the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Usually when a soldier is 
recruited, trained and indoctrinated into the U.S. Army he or she is first 
introduced to a corps of affiliation. Most training installations in the U.S. Army 
have at least one corps affiliation. A corps often contains two-three divisions.  
Divisions can deploy as operational units. Their functions are similar to 
corps with the added responsibility to expect to deploy forces, either as whole 
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units or as sub-unit allocations to operational commands within an area of 
responsibility (AoR). Divisions are generally associated with Forces Command 
(FORSCOM) similar to the way corps are affiliated with TRADOC. The 
contrasting factor is that TRADOC units do not deploy, they train soldiers in 
training commands for eventual assignment to FORSCOM sub-units, which do 
deploy. Divisions most often contain brigades. 
Brigades are generally the smallest sub-unit of deployment in the 
FORSCOM structure. A brigade will have smaller sub-units, however brigades 
usually do not allocate battalions to areas of responsibility separately; unless it 
being attached to a receiving command that is already in an AoR. Primarily, this 
is because of the enormous amount of support functions that brigades provide to 
battalions. Brigades have a similar relationship to battalions like divisions have to 
brigades. The pattern repeats itself to companies and platoons. For expediency, 
assume that there is little difference in the relationships between senior, 
container organizations and their sub-units. In order to quantify what each of 
these unit terms means, the base case will be a tank platoon, which will be built 
into a division. 
By U.S. Army TO&E structure, a tank platoon consists of four M1A1 
Abrams main battle tanks with four crewmembers for each tank or sixteen 
personnel in a tank platoon. A tank company consists of three platoons or twelve 
tanks manned by forty-eight personnel. The company has additional support 
personnel and two additional tanks, one for the Company Commander and the 
other for the Executive Officer (the second in command of the company). The 
total personnel in the company is sixty-three. The following is a summary table of 
how this will builds to a tank division. This table does not mention all of the 
support vehicles and equipment. 
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 Unit Level Description Quantification 
Tank 
Battalion 
A tank battalion contains 4 tank 
companies with 14 tanks and 63 
personnel each, and a 
headquarters support company, 
which contains 330 support 
personnel, staff and battalion 
command group. 
A tank battalion has 56 tanks 
including an additional two for 
the battalion commander and 
Battalion S-3. The number of 
personnel assigned is (63 X4) 
+ 330 support personnel ≈ 
582 personnel. 
Tank Brigade A tank brigade contains 4 tank 
battalions with 56 tanks, 582 
personnel each, and a 
headquarters support company, 
which contained 430 support 
personnel, staff and brigade 
command group. Note: 
Additionally there is an artillery 
battalion, a support battalion and 
other attachments, which we will 
not add to our count for 
generality. 
A tank brigade has 226 tanks 
including an additional two for 
the Brigade Commander and 
Brigade S-three. The number 
of personnel assigned is (582 
X4) + 430 support personnel 
≈ 2758. This does not reflect 
the true total of personnel 
assigned or attached to a 
brigade. Therefore the 
numbers are minimal 
representations. 
Tank Division A tank division, if it were 
deployed as an organic 
operational unit, would employ 4 
tank brigades, possibly a fire 
support brigade, aviation assets 
and various combat support and 
service support attachments.  
A tank division has 
approximately 906 tanks 
including an additional two for 
the Division Commander and 
G-three. The number of 
personnel assigned at this 
level varies greatly and 
begins to lose fidelity with the 
pattern up to this point. The 
core personnel who compose 
a tank division number around 
15,000 personnel. 
 
Table 1: Generalization of unit organization using tank units 
 
Every person represented in the conceptual unit operates as part of a 
team, extracting unique information parts, which determines their specific 
missions. The smallest subcomponent of this structure is capable of planning 
missions is a tank platoon. Which means, minimally, that there can be 3 x 4 x 4 x 
4 = 192 missions being planned for one division. Added to that, are the logistics 
support units at each level, the fire support units, close air support aviation, 
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reconnaissance missions, and medical support operations; creating several 
opportunities for communication failures. 
2. Culture 
 According to Paul Sass,  
 
The U.S. Army is currently undergoing a metamorphosis, one in 
which its traditional “legacy” communications systems are evolving 
to a complex interconnection of numerous technologies, each 
based heavily on commercial standards, practices and services 
made affordable by the civilian world.1 
 
In the past fifteen years, the U.S. Army has experienced many facets of 
the evolution of computer networking in U.S. Army combat operations. The Army 
has learned much about the tremendous advantages computer networking 
technology can bring to the modern battlefield. It is still learning some expensive 
lessons about what computer technology cannot do, both ‘not yet’ and probably 
‘not ever’.   
Some of the technology successfully employed by the Army has already 
been accepted as part of how the Army conducts military operations. Yet, the 
search continues for the next big technological advantage to propagate through 
research, development and procurement. Technology can solve many of the 
Army’s situational awareness problems; however, a key question remains, ‘what 
can you do for me now?’   
The most glaring irony, however, is while the U.S. Army is demanding 
much for the future of computer technology and automation, we actually still 
struggle to take full advantage of what computing and networking technology has 
already provided us. Some of the most basic concepts of productivity, which are 
common in most large civilian institutions and private corporations, are still 
propagating their way through middle and lower-level units of the U.S. Army.  
                                                 
1  Sass, Paul Communications networks for Force XXI Digitized Battlefield. 
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In many combat units and battalion level staffs, computers are used as 
glorified word processors with little understanding of the true productivity 
potential at their fingertips. Any use of information in more complex ways is ad-
hoc and based on the individual skills of the users to use the commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) productivity tools provided, such as Microsoft Office® or Corel 
Office Suite®, usually installed at assembly. Using and subsequently sharing 
information from compiled lists or databases is virtually non-existent.   
For these units, there is very little open networking being used. In fact, for 
many combat units at the battalion level and below, productivity means not 
having to type the same report twice. Sharing information over an integrated 
client/server network means that everyone in the workgroup can benefit from the 
work accomplished by one. Comparing this de facto model to the current 
networking models in use today, tactical units, at best, employ computer and 
information technology as ad hoc peer-to-peer networks. On average documents 
are shared by removable storage disks. Each automation platform is responsible 
for its own war-fighting platform. Information sharing and formatting for 
compatibility is not done. The U.S. Army is a long way from developing and using 
shared information effectively in tactical-level units. Basic productivity, however, 
is where the U.S. Army can gain a tremendous battlefield advantage.  
For the ‘not yets’, concepts that are waiting on the maturity of a particular 
technology, financial support from higher-units, or some other time extending 
obstacle, the U.S. Army can see the future but is frustrated by the inability to 
reach the goals. The revolution in technology is expensive. In order to refit the 
military to a new way of conducting war means retrofitting existing equipment 
with new capabilities while maintaining legacy compatibility, and technology 
insertion into new combat equipment.  The costs have been staggering to the 
DoD. The current practice is developing new combat vehicle technology over a 
period of multiple decades and thereby spreading out (or hiding) the enormous 
cost of developing this equipment.  
For the ‘not evers’, the U.S. Army, lacking in a wealth of knowledge of the 
technologies we are expected to use, struggles to understand why it cannot 
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make the technologies work, or work together, the way we envisioned that they 
should. There are political, doctrinal, financial and technical reasons that explain 
why Division Commanders cannot conduct real-time video teleconferencing with 
platoon leaders on the fly, a half-world away. However, part of the problem is that 
Division Commanders do not accept that some technical developments cannot or 
should not be undertaken. If a ‘technical expert’ is unfortunate enough to be 
tasked with making something that will not ever work (or will not work yet) 
technically possible, their choices are to pretend to attempt to make it work or 
risk losing their jobs. These futile exercises waste money, time and precious 
resources, and ultimately demonstrating things we already knew we could not do. 
This is not a technology issue but a culture and awareness issue. 
The military has to contend with the costs of developing network-
technology; training soldiers, and equipping them to use it. The U.S. Army is 
attempting to develop doctrine, which is a slow, tedious process that takes years 
to develop. Because the process is slow, the deployed technology may be 
obsolete by the time soldiers in the field actually incorporate them. Doctrine is 
very slow in a dynamic environment where the only constant is change and new 
technologies are being developed by a corps of contractors looking to take 
advantage of the current knowledge base of technologies.   
Few would argue that the networking resources are not available. Most 
will argue that the U.S. Army has not figured out how to use them effectively nor 
have we developed well-defined doctrine on how to use them. The U.S. Army 
has not invested in targeted information management goals and it is as if they 
are still in the discovery phase. Typically, soldiers in the field become the agents 
of discovery. The U.S. Army receives a component of technology, receive basic 
exposure training on it and begin using it. True doctrine emerges from using the 
technology in the field to gain an advantage of some sort. The advantage may 
eventually be discovered through trial and error, generalized and incorporated 
into policies and procedures as to how the component should be used. 
Eventually, local policies and procedures find their way to training, field and 
doctrine manuals. 
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If this method is employed to computer technology and information 
management tool development, the full potential that the technology promises us 
may never be realized. The Army cannot leave computer technology’s 
development to chance by hoping that soldiers in the field figure out how to use it 
effectively. Soldiers in the field with information management skills are rare and 
only have the authority to develop problems, which could be both local and 
global. The results are multiple solutions to computing problems, often 
incompatible with each other. To solve problems on a larger scale, global 
authority must drive the development of global solutions to global problems in 
order to, at a minimum, address compatibility issues that will arise.     
B. THE U.S. ARMY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
1. Protocols 
The communications software backbone of the tactical Internet is the 
Ethernet and X.25 packet switching capability of the mobile tactical network 
infrastructure. This packet switching is facilitated by Mobile Subscriber 
Equipment (MSE) switches, which are fitted into specialized communications 
HMMWVs. The MSE switches support voice circuit switching and data packet 
switching at each vehicle. These vehicles are issued one per combat brigade. 
During planning and execution of combat missions the vehicles are positioned 
strategically to provide coverage for voice and data exchange between end 
nodes. Also, by modifying the Domain Naming Services (DNS) to be a more 
distributed service, data and voice subscribers can operate, with minimal loss of 
connectivity, in a mobile environment, that mimics cellular service. 
The routing hierarchy is sustained at the corps and above level. To 
compare it to a civilian model, logically, a corps level unit provides local ‘Internet’ 
service. Routing packets between different corps is similar to routing packets up 
to a regional service provider or possibly a national service provider to carry long 
haul messages to other corps or even back to the United States. The semi-open 
nature of this packet network capability means that packets can be switched, 
globally to any node, anywhere in the world that is affiliated with the network. 
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Essentially, this network infrastructure supports the routing of Internet Protocol 
packets implying that the civilian global Internet can carry these messages. This 
also implies that with the current communications standards, two nodes which 
are carrying the same port services and transport layer protocols can 
communicate data packets over the civilian internet. 
2. Media 
The DoD’s garrison communications infrastructure is virtually the same 
infrastructure used by civilian organizations. The Army uses COTS routers and 
switches to carry data communications, globally. Installations use fiber-optics 
backbones and borrowed bandwidth on government and civilian satellite 
transceivers.  Servers and clients are built with commercially available hardware 
and install Microsoft Operating Systems. If fact, most of the Department of the 
Army (DA) Information Technology professionals are commercially trained 
civilians who are hired by requisition. The requisitions explicitly state the desire 
for people trained and certified to commercial standards. They do not receive 
specialized training in military equipment and media.  
The tactical communications model is different for obvious reasons. Most 
notably, building a static infrastructure is inefficient and counterproductive. 
Tactical units position themselves in a geographically distributed manner for 
survivability concerns. These same factors create obstacles to effective wired 
media connectivity and therefore more flexible solutions have evolved to help 
units maintain connectivity and communications.  
A drawback to this infrastructure is that it is difficult to sustain. It is 
vulnerable to environmental obstacles such as the terrain, unit distribution, 
weather considerations, dirt and the wear and tear that comes with constantly 
being disassembled, moved and reassembled.  
Maintaining tactical communications requires highly skilled networking and 
communications experts. The U.S. Army is feverishly attempting to train these 
experts at military and civilian colleges and universities across the country. Part 
of the challenge is training the appropriate technologies and another part is 
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retaining personnel to keep their skills current. Training service-members, in high 
demand skills, creates very marketable soldiers to civilian organizations. With 
profit motivation as the primary motivator, civilian organizations can afford to pay 
skilled technology experts far better than the military is willing to. 
C. SUMMARY 
The technical infrastructure necessary to support data communications is 
currently fielded and available to tactical units in the field. If the U.S. Army takes 
the initiative to develop better information management solutions for lower level 
tactical units, it will take time to evolve to a point where information superiority is 
a central training and execution factor. However, the benefits of information 
superiority, efficient mission planning, and improved situational awareness 
remain unchallenged. 
Because the tactical Army has the unique challenge of making technology 
work in a dynamic environment, more emphasis must be placed on integrating 
networking into the mission planning process. Without advanced planning on the 
battlefield, the reliability and availability of the network will suffer. If this occurs, 
the information that units depend on will prove unreliable and information 
technology, as a combat multiplier, will be dismissed as useless. 
There are influencing factors becoming an information-based Army. Until 
the U.S. Army evolves as a technical culture, the U.S. Army will continue to 
struggle with using the technology in tactical environments. More specifically, the 
U.S. Army is going to have to recruit individuals who are technically savvy and 
incorporate the technology into the entire mission planning functions and 
products.  
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III. STAFF ORGANIZATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
In order to understand the manner in which the U.S. Army distributes 
information in tactical operations, we need to evaluate the tactical environment, 
the staff organization and the functions the unit staff use to create the 
information. This is not only beneficial to understanding the current processes but 
also to understanding the sources of information. Understanding the sources of 
information makes it easier to transition to understanding how we can modify the 
information distribution processes to make the information provided more 
efficiently shared and distributed. 
In the next chapter, evaluating the Military Decision Making Process 
provides a framework that can be generalized and ported to any size or type of 
unit. Assuming that the computing and networking framework is functional, these 
processes can be implemented as information distribution processes under a 
tactical network as easily as the current process of bringing all of the information 
developers together to distribute the information. 
The staff organization is evaluated for reference only. The information this 
chapter is taken from the published Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations, 1993. 
In this study, the human role players execute a set of functions. The functions 
require teamwork, which dictates that every member of the team understand the 
tasks the team, as well as each team member, is expected to perform. The focus 
is not placed on the uniqueness of the staff members but on the functions they 
perform, the information they create and how it is distributed to other participants 
in their function.  
Staff role players currently focus on their own functional analysis of 
missions and contribute their information to the core information products 
(discussed in the MDMP chapter) and specify tasks to their Battlefield Operating 
System (BOS) resources. BOS integration is based on coordination meetings 
with maneuver forces. Sometimes, but not necessarily within the formal meeting 
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processes between the brigade commander, his subordinate commanders and 
staff members.   
1. Staff 
 The staff of a combat brigade is responsible to the Brigade Commander to 
aid him in managing the MDMP process. From the moment the brigade receives 
a warning order, an alert message that a mission will be coming their way soon, 
the clock begins and the staff begins to execute the mission planning and 
preparation tasks that they have been previously trained to do. Below is a 
discussion of a combat brigade’s key staff members, their responsibilities to their 
commander, their BOS responsibility. 
2. Organization 
 Figure 1 illustrates that the Brigade Commander has three staff 
components, each covering different sub-domains within the commander’s 
overall responsibility. The coordinating staff is responsible for the coordinating 
the operations and resource management of combat operations. The special 
staff personnel are attached or assigned to the brigade to support the 
commander’s mission as combat multipliers. These personnel generally act as 
liaisons between combat support commands and maneuver commands.  
 Where there is a reference to a ‘J’ or a ‘G’ staff position, the meaning 
attached to the position is Joint staff or General Officer Staff position. Joint 
means inter-service and General refers to high-level staff positions such as 
division level and above.  
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Figure 1: Staff Organization Chart from FM 100-5  
3. PERSONAL STAFF 
Personal staff members are assigned or attached to a command, to 
advise a commander on issues and concerns that may be of indirect significance 
to the organization. For example, there may be religious concerns with Muslim 
American soldiers that are deployed to the Middle East. The commander may 
need to be aware of this, and also may need to delegate direct management to a 
staff member. Personal staff members manage issues of this nature in Garrison 
and in operational AoR for the commander.  The command’s Chaplain is one 
example.  There are other examples, which are not mentioned here because 
they are not directly part of the mission planning process. 
4. COORDINATING STAFF 
a. Executive Officer-Chief of Staff 
The Executive Officer is the commander’s principal assistant for 
directing, coordinating, supervising, and training the staff, except in areas the 
commander reserves. The commander normally delegates executive 
management authority (equivalent to command of the staff) to the XO. The XO 
frees the commander from routine details and passes pertinent data, information, 
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and insight from the staff to the commander and from the commander to the staff.  
The XO is responsible for:  
• Integrating and synchronizing the war-fighting plans 
• Managing the commander’s critical information requirements 
• Establishing, managing, and enforcing the staff planning time-line in 
accordance with the commander’s guidance 
• Supervising the targeting, deep operations, and other cross-forward line of 
troops planning cells 
• Integrating deception planning and fratricide countermeasures into the 
plan 
• Determining liaison requirements, establishing liaison information 
exchange requirements, and receiving liaison teams 
• Directly supervising the main command post and headquarters cell, 
including displacement, protection, security, and communications 
• Directing and supervising the staff’s planning process 
• Ensuring all staff members provide intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield (IPB) input to the G2. 
• Maintaining knowledge of all directives, orders, and instructions the 
commander issues to the staff, subordinate commanders, and subordinate 
units, and verifying their execution 
b. S1-Personnel 
The S1 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning human 
resources (military and civilian), which include personnel readiness, personnel 
services, and headquarters management. A personnel officer is located at every 
echelon from battalion through corps. Following are some of the areas and 
activities that are the specific responsibility of the S1. 
 
• Analyzing personnel strength data to determine current combat 
capabilities 
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• Development of plans to maintain strength 
• Personnel replacement management, which includes: receiving, 
accounting, processing, and delivering personnel 
• Advising the commander and staff on matters concerning individual 
replacements and the operation of the replacement system 
• Preparing estimates for personnel replacement requirements based on 
estimated casualties, non-battle losses, and foreseeable administrative 
losses 
• Integrating the personnel replacement plan from the S1 with the 
equipment replacement plan from the S4 and with the training plan from 
the S3 
• Coordinating and monitoring readiness processing, movement support, 
and the positioning of replacement-processing units 
c. S2-Intelligence 
The S2 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning 
military intelligence (MI), counterintelligence, security operations, and military 
intelligence training. An intelligence officer is located at every echelon from 
battalion through corps. Following are the areas and activities that are some of 
specific responsibilities of the S2: 
 
• Disseminating intelligence to commanders and other users in a timely 
manner 
• Collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence 
information 
• Conducting and coordinating intelligence preparation of the battlefield 
(IPB) 
• Recommending unit area of interest and assisting the staff in defining unit 
battlespace 
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• Evaluating the threat (their doctrine, order of battle factors, high-value 
targets (HVTs), capabilities, and weaknesses) 
• Determining enemy most probable and most dangerous courses of action 
and key events 
• Coordinating with the entire staff and recommending PIR for the 
commander’s critical information requirements 
• Integrating staff input to IPB products for staff planning, decision making, 
and targeting 
• Coordinating ground and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance 
operations with other collection assets 
• Participating in targeting meeting 
d. S3-Operations 
The S3 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning 
training, operations and plans, and force development and modernization. An 
operations officer is located at every echelon from battalion through corps. The 
areas and activities that are the specific responsibility of the G3 (S3) follow:  
 
• Participating in targeting meetings 
• Reviewing plans and orders of subordinate units 
• Synchronizing tactical operations with all staff sections 
• Reviewing entire operations order for synchronization and completeness 
• Coordinating with the S2 to write the reconnaissance and surveillance 
annex, which includes tasking units with available assets, to collect the 
commander’s priority intelligence requirements 
• Recommending Intelligence Requirements to the S2. 
• Integrating fire support into all operations 
• Planning troop movement, including route selection, priority of movement, 
timing, providing of security, bivouacking, quartering, staging, and 
preparing of movement order 
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• Determining combat service support (CSS) resource requirements in 
coordination with the G1 and G4 
• Participating in course of action and decision support template (DST) 
development with S2 and FSCOORD 
• Coordinating with ENCOORD, S2, S5, and surgeon to establish 
environmental vulnerability protection levels 
• Recommending the general locations of command posts 
• Coordinating with the S1 civilian personnel involvement in tactical 
operations 
e. S4-Logistics Supply Management 
At brigade and battalion levels, the S4 not only coordinates 
activities but also executes requirements for the commander and unit. The areas 
and activities that are the specific planning and preparation responsibilities of the 
S4 are as follow: 
 
• Providing information on enemy logistics operations to the S2 for inclusion 
to IPB 
• Developing with the S3 the logistics plan to support operations 
• Coordinating with the S3 and S1 on equipping replacement 
• Coordinating with supporting unit commander on the current and future 
support capability of that unit 
• Coordinating the selection and recommending of main supply routes 
(MSR) and logistics support areas, in coordination with the ENCOORD, to 
the S3. 
• Coordinating the requisition, acquisition, and storage of supplies and 
equipment, and the maintenance of Materiel records. 
• Ensuring, in coordination with the Provost Marshall, that accountability and 
security of supplies and equipment are adequate. 
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• Calculating and recommending to the S3 basic and prescribed loads and 
assisting the S3 in determining the required supply rates. 
• Coordinating and monitoring the collection and distribution of excess, 
surplus, and salvage supplies and equipment. 
• Directing the disposal of captured enemy supplies and equipment after 
coordination with the S2. 
• Coordinating the allocation of petroleum products to subordinate units. 
• Coordinating with the S5 to support foreign nation and host nation support 
requirements. 
f. S5-Civil-Military Affairs 
The S5 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil-
military operations (the civilian impact on military operations and the impact of 
military operations on the civilian populace). The S5 has responsibility to 
enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and 
personnel in the area of operations to ensure the success of the mission. The S5 
is required at all echelons from battalion through corps level but authorized only 
at division and corps levels. Once deployed, units and task forces below division 
level may be authorized an S5. The areas and activities that are the specific 
responsibility of the S5 follow: 
 
• Advising the commander of the civilian impact on military operations. 
• Advising the commander on his legal and moral obligations concerning the 
impact of military operations on the local populace (economic, 
environmental, and health) for both the short and long term 
• Minimizing civilian interference with combat operations, to include 
dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions 
• Advising the commander on the employment of other military units that 
can perform CMO missions 
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• Establishing and operating a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to 
maintain liaison with and coordinate the operations of other US 
government agencies; host nation civil and military authorities; and 
nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations in the 
area of operations 
• Planning positive and continuous community relations programs to gain 
and maintain public understanding and good will, and to support military 
operations 
• Coordinating with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) concerning advice to 
the commander on rules of engagement for dealing with civilians in the 
area of operations 
• Providing recommended Civil-Military Officer (CMO)-related information 
requirements and Essential Elements Of Friendly Information (EEFI) to the 
G2 
• Providing the S2 operational information gained from civilians in the area 
of operations 
• Coordinating with the S3 PSYOP on trends in public opinion 
• Coordinating with the S1 surgeon on the military use of civilian medical 
facilities, materials, and supplies 
g. S6-SIGO 
The S6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning signal 
operations, automation management, network management, and information 
security. A S6 officer is located at all echelons of command from battalion 
through corps. The areas and activities that are the specific responsibility of the 
S6 follows: 
 
• Recommending signal support priorities for force information operations 
• Recommending locations for command posts within information 
battlespace 
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• Coordinating with the S5 the availability of commercial information 
systems and services for military use 
• Coordinating, updating, and disseminating the command frequencies lists. 
• Managing communications protocols, and coordinating user interfaces of 
defense information system networks (DISNs) and command and control 
systems down to battalion tactical internets 
• Recommending information requirements to the S2 
• Participating in targeting meetings 
• Coordinating the configuration of local area networks that support the 
force 
• Managing communications security (COMSEC) measures, including the 
operation of the Information 
• The command’s signal support network 
5. SPECIAL STAFF 
a. Chemo-Chemical Officer 
The chemical officer is the special staff officer responsible for the 
use of or requirement for chemical assets and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical 
(NBC) defense and smoke operations. A chemical officer is at every echelon of 
command. Besides his common staff responsibilities, the chemical officer’s 
specific responsibilities are as follows: 
 
• Recommends Courses of Action (COA) to minimize friendly and civilian 
vulnerability 
• Provides technical advice and recommendations on mission-oriented 
protective posture (MOPP), troop safety criteria, operational exposure 
guidance, NBC reconnaissance, smoke operations, biological warfare 
defense measures, and mitigating techniques 
• Assesses probability and impact of NBC-related casualties 
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• Coordinates across the entire staff while assessing the impact of enemy 
NBC-related attacks and hazards on current and future operations 
• Conducts NBC IPB vulnerability analysis and recommends information 
requirements to the G2 through the G3 
• Plans, supervises, and coordinates NBC decontamination (except patient 
decontamination) operations 
• Supervises the nuclear and chemical accident and incident response 
assistance program 
• Assesses weather and terrain data to determine if environmental factors 
are conducive to enemy employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) or, at corps level, to the friendly employment of nuclear weapons  
• Plans, coordinates, and manages chemical and radiological survey and 
monitoring operations 
• Plans, coordinates, and manages NBC reconnaissance operations 
• Estimates effect of a unit’s radiation exposure state on mission 
assignments 
• Coordinates with the S4 on logistics as it relates to chemical defense 
equipment and supplies, maintenance of chemical equipment, and 
transportation of chemical assets 
• Coordinates NBC reconnaissance assets into the reconnaissance and 
surveillance plan 
• Plans and recommends integration of smoke and obscurants into tactical 
operations 
• Conducts smoke target development 
• Advises the commander, in conjunction with the surgeon, on possible 
hazards and effects of low-level hazards, such as low-level radiation and 
toxic industrial material 
• Advises the commander, in conjunction with the ADCOORD, on passive 
defense measures to assist in protecting and warning the force against 
missile attack 
• Advises the commander on the use of riot control agents 
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b. FSO-Fire Support Officer 
The fire support coordinator is the special staff officer for 
coordinating fire support and field artillery assets and operations in the 
command. The Fire Support Officer is the senior field artillery officer in the force. 
He is the commander of a field artillery unit supporting the force. The assistant or 
deputy Fire Support Officer is a permanent staff officer on the staff representing 
the Fire Support Officer in his absence. There is a Fire Support Officer with the 
maneuver force at every echelon of command from battalion through corps. At 
brigade, regiment, and below, the Fire Support Officer’s specific responsibilities 
are as follows: 
 
• Develops, with the S3, a concept of fires to support the operation 
• Plans and coordinates fire support tasks for supporting forces in contact 
• Plans and coordinates fire support tasks for supporting the commander’s 
battle plan 
• Plans and coordinates fire support tasks for synchronizing the fire support 
system 
• Plans and coordinates fire support tasks for sustaining the fire support 
system 
• Plans and coordinates fire support tasks for integrating non-lethal fires into 
the overall scheme of fires 
• Participates in the targeting meeting and produces targeting products, 
such as target selection standards (TSS), and high-payoff target list 
(HPTL) 
• Plans and coordinates, through the G3 (S3), with the G2 (S2), signal 
officer, and EWO, the use of electronic warfare support and electronic 
protection as part of fire support 
• Recommends information requirements to the G2 through the G3 
• Plans and coordinates with the ENCOORD for the use of air- and artillery-
delivered FASCAM 
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• Recommends to the G3 (S3) the field artillery ammunition required supply 
rate 
• Provides an estimate of the adequacy of the field artillery ammunition 
controlled supply rate 
• Recommends internal reallocation of the controlled supply rate for 
subordinate commands to match priorities for support 
• Establishes priorities and focus for counter-fire radar employment 
• Recommends field artillery organization for combat 
• Coordinates positioning of fire support assets in specific area of 
operations 
• Coordinates and synchronizes joint fire support platforms 
c. ENCOORD-Engineer Coordinator 
The engineer coordinator (ENCOORD) is the special staff officer for 
coordinating engineer assets and operations for the command. The ENCOORD 
is usually the senior engineer officer in the force. He is the commander of an 
engineer unit supporting the command. The assistant or deputy ENCOORD is a 
permanent staff officer representing the ENCOORD in his absence. An 
ENCOORD is located at corps and division levels and one is normally task-
organized to maneuver brigades and battalions. Besides his common staff 
responsibilities, the ENCOORD’s specific mission planning responsibilities are as 
follows:  
 
• Mobility, Counter-mobility (CM), Survivability 
• Recommends engineer organization for combat 
• Plans and coordinates with the S3 -Fire Support Officer on the integration 
of obstacles and fires 
• Advises the commander on the use of organic and non-organic engineer 
assets 
• Advises the commander on the employment and reduction of obstacles 
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• Advises the commander on environmental issues, coordinates with other 
staff officers to determine the impact of operations on the environment, 
and helps the commander integrate environmental considerations into the 
decision-making process 
• Provides a terrain-visualization mission folder to determine the terrain’s 
effect on both friendly and enemy operations 
• Produces maps and terrain products (coordinates with the G2 for planning 
and distribution) 
• Plans and supervises construction, maintenance, and repair of camps and 
facilities for friendly forces, enemy prisoners of war, and civilian internees 
• Plans and coordinates with the FSCOORD the use of family of scatterable 
mines (FASCAM) 
• Plans and coordinates environmental protection, critical areas, and 
protection levels 
• Assists the S2 in IPB preparation, to include preparing the engineer 
battlefield assessment (EBA) 
• Participates in the targeting meeting. 
• Provides information on the status of engineer assets on hand. 
• Recommends to the S4 main supply routes and logistics areas based on 
technical information 
• Recommends information requirements to the S2 through the S3 
• Plans the reorganization of engineers to fight as infantry combat units 
when the commander deems their emergency employment necessary. 
d. ALO- Air Liaison Officer 
The air liaison officer is the special staff officer responsible for 
coordinating tactical air assets and operations such as close air support (CAS), 
air interdiction, joint suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), reconnaissance, 
and airlift. The ALO is the senior Air Force officer with each tactical air control 
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party (TACP). An ALO is authorized at corps, division, and brigade levels. The 
ALO’s specific planning responsibilities are as follows: 
 
• Advises the commander and staff on the employment of tactical air 
(TACAIR). 
• Coordinates tactical air support missions with the fire support element and 
the appropriate AC2 element. 
• Recommends information requirements to the S2 through the S3 
• Participates in targeting meetings 
B. SUMMARY 
As is illustrated, each member of the coordinating and special staff must 
perform a number of planning and coordination tasks prior to executing a combat 
mission, which under the current convention means a tremendous amount of 
meetings, coordination, and information distribution. The primary means of 
communicating tasks is through face-to-face coordination meetings and 
distribution of increasingly large documents that we will eventually identify as 
message blocks. 
The flow of message traffic is complex and unpredictable. Units have tried, 
in the past, to log documents of the message distributions and message update 
distributions. This turned out to be cumbersome to the extent that keeping track 
of who received which version of which documents, and who did not, became 
more difficult than actually writing the documents. Message distribution and 
management can be modified using automation and a modified message 
distribution scheme. If information can be distributed more efficiently, then it 
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 IV. THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS  
A. MDMP OVERVIEW 
The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is the current definitive 
process combat commanders and staffs at battalion and above operating levels 
of the U.S. Army use to develop mission plans. The MDMP process is similar to 
the problem solving process with a more focused detail given to the factors that 
affect the tactical/operational environment. The MDMP requires the support and 
participation of the coordinating and special staff members in order to be 
successfully implemented in any combat environment. If any of the staff functions 
fail then the process is incomplete: increasing the risk of implementing a plan 
without all of the information. Different decisions might be made with additional 
information.  
There exist a number of written products that are developed directly from 
MDMP process and this thesis is focused on modifying the products. Because of 
the limited number of formal products that are generated, their importance is 
paramount to the success of the combat mission. Complete, timely and clear are 
the prime measures of how effective the product was in causing units to execute 
combat tasks efficiently and as expected.  
Below is a summary of the process steps of a mission analysis 
process, as taken from FM 100-5 Operations, 1993. It describes what should 
take place, as well as who should be involved in the process. The products are 
addressed by who does them and what they contribute. 
1. Receive Mission 
The decision-making process begins with the receipt or anticipation of a 
new mission. This can either come from an order issued by higher headquarters, 
or derived from an ongoing operation. For example, the commander determines 
that he has the opportunity to accomplish his higher commander’s intent 
significantly different from the original course of action because of a change in 
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enemy disposition. This may cause him to plan for a significantly different course 
of action. 
As soon as a new mission is received, the unit’s S3 operations section 
issues a warning order to the staff alerting them of the pending planning process. 
Unit standard operating procedures (SOP) identify who is to attend, who the 
alternates are, and where they should assemble. The XO generally ensures that 
attached units have copies of the unit SOP to ensure they will understand what is 
expected of them during the orders process.  
2. Analyze Mission 
Mission analysis is a comprehensive process that follows the receipt of a 
mission from the higher echelon. It is designed to parse information received 
from higher echelon headquarters and extract any specified or implied tasks that 
the order dictates. To facilitate the necessary movement and preparation of 
subordinate personnel and equipment, mission analysis is conducted as early as 
possible.  
The coordinating and special staff personnel are expected to respond to 
the warning order by taking preparatory actions and issuing warning orders to 
their subordinate members. During or immediately following the warning order 
issue, the staff members are expected to participate in the course of action 
development process in addition to planning their own operations to support the 
commander’s intent.  
After conducting the initial mission analysis, each staff section should be 
able to extract explicit tasks expected of them. Critical and implied tasks are 
identified to support the specified tasks. For example, if a maneuver unit is 
expected to move from one point to another using the most direct route, and a 
river bisects this route, then the implied task may be to conduct a river crossing 
operation in the process of accomplishing the specified task. This is important, 
particularly for heavy combat units, containing tanks, infantry carriers and 
mechanized artillery. A river crossing is an extremely significant event, however, 
 34   
it is not the mission itself and may not affect other sub-units and it may not be 
spelled out in the higher unit mission plan. 
Therefore, it is important for the unit conducting this operation to receive 
this specified task as early as possible in order to make the necessary 
preparations and movements for the mission and the river crossing operation 
nested within it. Additional detail may be required in a second warning order to 
give the sub-unit enough time to prepare for the mission.  
3. Course of Action Development 
After receiving guidance, the staff develops several courses of action for 
analysis and comparison. The commander must involve the entire staff in the 
development. His guidance and intent focus the staff’s creativity to produce a 
comprehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. His direct participation 
helps the staff get responsive, accurate answers to questions that occur during 
the process.  
4. Course of Action Analysis 
The course of action analysis identifies which course of action 
accomplishes the mission with minimum casualties while best positioning the 
force to retain the initiative for future operations. It helps the commander and the 
staff to determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while 
protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage. No written 
product should be distributed at this time, since no decisions have been made as 
to who will be executing anything. 
5. Course of Action Comparison 
The course of action comparison starts with each staff officer analyzing 
and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each course from his 
perspective. Each staff member presents his findings for the others 
consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed earlier, the staff then 
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outlines each course, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing 
the strengths and weaknesses of each course of action helps identify their 
advantages and disadvantages with respect to each other. The staff compares 
courses of action to identify the one that has the highest probability of success 
against the most likely and the most dangerous enemy courses of action.  
6. Course of Action Approval 
If the commander has observed and participated in the planning process, 
the course of action decision may be rapidly apparent and the commander can 
make an immediate decision. If he has not participated in the process to this 
point, or has not made a decision, a decision briefing will still be required. Good 
course of action comparison charts and sketches assist the commander in 
visualizing and distinguishing between each course. If only one course was 
developed, no decision is required, unless this course becomes unsuitable, 
infeasible, or unacceptable. If this occurs, another course of action must be 
developed.  
As appropriate, the core of the impending operations order is the course of 
action approved by the commander. Immediately following the course of action 
development process, a third, detailed warning order is generated and distributed 
to the sub-units. This warning order is very detailed, however, the majority of the 
mission information should already be available to subordinate units due to the 
accumulation of warning orders. Subsequently, the units should be almost 
prepared to execute to mission by the time they receive the formal order.   
7. Orders Production 
 The actual operations order is the formalization of all of the process steps 
and previous warnings about the upcoming mission. If the process was executed 
correctly, most of the information in the order should come as no surprise to the 
units receiving them. The order itself should not be needed except as a reference 
for clarification of some specific details. If sub-unit commanders and soldiers find 
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themselves constantly referring to the order for clarification, then the process 
needs to be reviewed. The generations order considered the final product of the 
mission development process. Any written document following its distribution is 




Figure 2: Mission planning and development process illustration 
B. MISSION PRODUCTS 
As will be echoed throughout the remaining chapters, the earlier in the 
mission development process units receive clearly specified tasks, the greater 
their ability to prepare. The most valuable resource to units in preparation for a 
mission is time. The more preparation time the greater the chances of success in 
execution. In contrast, wasting time, works against these odds.   
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a. Warning Orders  
Warning orders serve as the indicator to begin the mission development 
cycle and troop leading procedures discussed below.  As the number of warning 
orders increase, the greater the amount of detail they contain. Intuitively, it is an 
indication of an approaching execution time, sometimes referred to as T-time. 
The following is a short non-exclusive list of what the minimum expectations in a 
warning order is: 
• Required maps  
• The enemy situation and significant intelligence events 
• The higher headquarters' mission 
• Mission or tasks of the issuing headquarters 
• The commander's intent statement (when available) 
• Orders for preliminary action, including reconnaissance and surveillance 
• Coordinating instructions (estimated time lines, orders group meeting, time 
to issue order) 
• Service support instructions, any special equipment necessary, regrouping 
of transport, or preliminary movement of units 
 
Any line of information that specifies or implies action is of benefit 
to the receiving sub-unit; the sub-units utilization of time increases as the details 
of the mission tasks increase. 
2. Operations Orders  
As stated earlier, if the mission development process of the higher 
headquarters units is well executed, the tasks in the operations order should 
come as no surprise to the recipients. There should be only minor adjustments 
left to make by the time the order is finalized and distributed. The operations 
order is a more detailed and formal document than a warning order and is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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a. Situation 
The situation paragraph outlines the environment the mission is to 
be executed in. In short, it defines the tactical and operational problem. It also 
links the units together as task organized components of the immediate higher 
unit leadership. It describes the terrain and expected weather conditions when 
the operation will be executed. It lists the expected enemy forces and the 
organized friendly units that will meet on the battlefield.  
Arguably the most important information components in the 
situation paragraph are the mission statements and commander’s intent of the 
next two or three higher echelons of command. This gives the reader a quick 
reference to how the higher echelons of command see the collective forces 
accomplishing the task and also acts as a guideline for making tactical judgment 
calls during the execution of the mission.  
Every soldier within a unit should be able to reference 
commander’s intent statements two to three levels of command above them. 
There are generally no explicit tasks specified in this paragraph. It is used for 
reference and battlefield visualization only.  As a component of the operations 
order, the majority of the information in the situation paragraph is information 
either known well in advance, slow to change from mission to mission or both. 
This point is emphasized in more detail later. 
b. Mission Statement 
The mission statement is a succinct set of sentences that state 
definitively what the mission is, as seen by the issuing commander. It contains 
one to three statements of execution as follows: mission, on-order mission and 
be prepared mission. The elements of the mission statement are:  who, what, 
when where why, task and purpose. The on-order mission statement has the 
same elements as the mission statement with the exception that the ‘when’ 
element is replaced with ‘on-order’. The ‘be-prepared’ mission statement is 
essentially the same as the mission statement with the added label. ‘Be 
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prepared’ missions have the lowest priority of preparation because they may or 
may not be executed.  
Generally, units use SOPs for specific types of missions. Based on 
the ‘what’ element of the mission statement, units can refer to their SOP manual 
for what planning and preparation tasks are implied by the specific mission and 
execution task list. 
c. Execution  
The execution paragraph is the most complex component of the 
operations order because it defines how we are going to solve the problem 
defined in the situation paragraph. In essence, it contains the vast majority of 
specified and implied tasks of the entire order. Most of the instructions for how an 
operation is to be conducted and, equally as important, why it is to be conducted 
are contained within the execution paragraph. The tone of the paragraph is 
similar to a cause and effect linkage of execution tasks though the format is 
generally narratives and lists. Therefore the art and science of leadership is to 
determine from the order, the cause and effect linkages, as well as the 
chronology and the critical essence of the tasks within the statement. This is 
where the scope of this study’s analysis will take shape.   
The following topics are entries into the execution paragraph of a 
combat operations order as recommended by the (TRADOC) and are echoed in 
most field manuals as the de facto standard by which the effectiveness of an 
operations order is measured.  
d. Commander’s Intent 
The commander’s intent is the vision statement or end-state 
statement of a given combat mission. It is usually narrative in nature and 
because of this, there have been years of debate as to how long the intent 
statement should be and what it should contain. This statement serves more to 
circumscribe the actions of the units under the responsibility of that commander, 
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for situations where there are no specified or implied tasks. It allows soldiers in 
combat to make judgment calls of what they think the commander would have 
told them to do in a given situation had he been able to anticipate every situation 
and capture it in writing. Hence, the enormous amount of debate as to what 
should go into it. 
 Most military scholars argue that it should be succinct and should 
reflect the commander’s personality and style. It should also be consistent from 
mission to mission. As soldiers begin to understand their commander’s style and 
personality, their ability to represent the commander’s intent in any situation 
improves.  
Though not as vital as the next few components for this study, 
some military scholars have argued that the set of commander’s intent 
statements (within the chain of command, two to three levels up) are the most 
important statements in the entire order because most military mishaps occur 
because of poor judgments made within the gray areas of what the commander 
says and want the commander actually desires.  
e. Concept of the Operation 
The concept of operation is a component of components paragraph 
that can be expressed in many different ways.  Below is a sample concept of 
operation matrix that shows the contents of specified tasks given to sub-units 
within a specific combat organization. The target level of this matrix is the 
brigade, as the issuing command, and the battalion, as the receiving command.  
f. Tasks to maneuver units 
The tasks to maneuver units are specified tasks directed to 
specified units. They are often general in nature. Their format is usually identical 
to mission statements, on-order mission statements and be prepared mission 
statements. The key difference is that these tasks are listed for every identifiable 
maneuver sub-unit within the issuing unit’s command.    
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g. Tasks to combat support units 
The tasks to combat support units are also specified tasks directed 
to specified units. They too are general in nature but often very different in format 
than those for maneuver units. The format is expected to be consistent with the 
types of information the specific types of supported units need. For instance a fire 
support unit needs very different information than that of an engineer unit. Often 
times engineer units execute their missions prior to the start of combat. Fire 
support units, on the other hand, share execution resources between 
reconnaissance and surveillance, counter-fire support and maneuver execution 
missions.  The key point here is that the anatomy of a task message can be 
generalized as message components the same way that maneuver tasks can be.    
h. Coordinating Instructions 
Coordinating instructions are explicit planning and preparation 
tasks that should be performed between two or more sub-units within the 
command. These tasks are often decipherable implied tasks however, the more 
critical the success, the more likely the coordination task is specified in this 
paragraph. 
i. Service Support 
Logistics support is a critical aspect of any combat mission. The 
support tasks that are explicitly stated can generate implicit tasks in order to 
accomplish them. Both explicit and implicit tasks are specific to the types of 
support units involved. The support can include medical, fuel, ammunition, water, 
engineering materiel movement; troop movement by land or by air transport and 
so on.  
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j. Command and Signal  
The command and control paragraph generally contains the chain 
of command location, signal instructions, radio frequency of units, the 
commander and specific staff frequencies.  Generally, there are no tasks issued 
in this paragraph. It should also be mentioned that most of the information in this 
paragraph should be determined well in advance; capable of being stored well in 
advance of the MDMP process.  
3. Fragmented Orders  
Fragmented orders are an extension of operations orders. By referencing 
an existing order and listing only the information that has changed from the 
referenced order, fragmented orders can save units time and resources.   
Units will usually use fragmented orders after an operations order is 
written, issued and in the process of being executed.  The components of a 
fragmented order are the same as the components of an operations order with 
the paragraphs that did not change omitted.    
4. TROOP LEADING PROCESS 
Troop leading procedures are an abbreviated planning process that 
company-level units and below use to determine what the planning, preparation 
and execution tasks are required. Companies and platoons do not have planning 
staffs. The commanders at these levels write their own orders based on the 
orders received from the higher-level units.  
However, because these units are expected to execute the plan, they 
have the least amount of time to determine what is required.  This is considered 
a terminal-level unit. In other words, all of the staff planning is intended to set 
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V. MISSION TASK DISTRIBUTION 
A. DISTRIBUTION OF TASKS OVER TIME 
The importance of lead-time in mission planning has given impetus to 
combat leaders to make early distribution of information a high priority. However 
the U.S. Army has limitations on its ability to disseminate formalized mission 
products as quickly as the commander perceives is possible. Because the U.S. 
Army constrains its efficiency of distributing time-critical information to the 
distribution efficiency of the formal mission products, the unit staffs introduce 
poor utilization of a fixed time quantum into its unit preparation processes by 
default.  
It has been shown in network communications that packet switching can 
be much more efficient than message switching. The reason is because the 
delay associated with processing and transmitting an entire message across a 
link can be more costly than the overhead associated with labeling several 
smaller packets and transmitting them independently. Intermediate processing 
and routing nodes have to receive and possibly queue entire messages before 
processing and re-transmitting them. Whereas with parts of a message being 
sent independently, the intermediate nodes can process and retransmit one part 
of a message while receiving another part of the message, that is, the terminal 
node will begin receiving parts of the entire message sooner than with message 
switching.  
If this logic is applied to mission-analysis products and parts of warning 
orders or operations orders are sent as soon as one has the minimum 
requirements for a message part, then the terminal-level units should receive 
useful information sooner and can respond to it by planning and preparing 
sooner. 
To further describe this, assume that in a given tactical environment, we 
generalize the amount of time it takes to prepare to execute one specified task as 
four hours.  The amount of planning and preparation time from the first-warning 
order, from a theater-level command, issued is ninety-six hours. Each cell 
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processes the received warning order and issues their own warning order to the 
next command and staff group. Consider a command and staff group as an 
enclosed, communications processing node and the warning order 
communication to the sub-unit staff as a link-level communication. Assume that a 
brigade node receives a warning order, begins processing, and retransmits a 
complete warning order to another sub-unit two hours later. This process repeats 
itself from intermediate node to intermediate node until it reaches its terminal 
point at the platoon level. By the time a platoon receives its first Warning order, 
eight to twelve hours have passed. This time cannot be recovered and the 
preparation for the mission still has to be completed.  
What if the message was filtered to send the most time-critical information 
first and the rest later on? In other words, the specified tasks are what the 
platoons and companies need to know immediately. If they can receive these 
tasks earlier, they gain the preparation time that they will know how to use.  
Therefore, by deconstructing the message format and prioritizing what needs to 
be sent, there is a potential gain in preparation time that can grow as the 
message traverses the staff planning nodes.   
B. ORDERS PROCESS REDEFINED 
The MDMP process has become the cornerstone of conventional combat 
planning and preparation for the U.S. Army for the past fifteen years. It has 
evolved from use in training and combat to be a trusted tool for setting the 
conditions for successful execution of combat missions. The process is efficient 
and most staff officers that use it would likely say that it is comprehensive, 
possibly even excessive in its level of detail. 
The major drawback of the MDMP is that it does not address certain types 
of execution shortcomings. Once again, one of the most important resource in 
mission planning and preparation is time for sub-units to respond to orders by 
conducting the same process as the issuing command and staff on a shorter time 
scale. As a rule of thumb, each level of command and staff is supposed to yield 
two thirds of its planning and preparation time to it subordinate units. In practice, 
though, this is rare. This is due, in part, to the orders processing delay that the 
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issuing staff incurs on receiving the orders themselves. The inability to yield 
planning and preparation time is also due to the fact that execution times are 
fixed and dictated at very high echelons of command. Hence, the use of the 
current process will always result in some level of delay. Therefore when the 
lowest units (maneuver platoons and reconnaissance squads) receive mission 
tasks, the mission clock has long since started.  
 
  Brigade Battalion Company Platoon 
Receives 
Order 8.00 5.28 3.48 2.30
Receives 
Order 12.00 7.92 5.23 3.45
Receives 








































 What Figure 3 shows is the effects of yielding two-thirds of planning time 
to sub-units. The more time the higher unit retains, the greater the time impact is 
to the sub-unit. It is incumbent on high echelon commands to push information to 
sub-unit commands as soon as possible. The sense of urgency sometimes has 
to be artificially created in order to enforce this as an issue of command policy. 
High-level staffs need to be mindful that the more time they take to process 
missions orders and distribute them, the less likely the combats units will be 
prepared to execute those missions.     
For comparative purposes, in electronic network communications, the 
largest delay a communications packet will incur is the queue delay at a high-
traffic router while waiting to be transmitted on a transmission link. Relative to the 
total transmission time queuing time accounts for about two-thirds of 
transmission time on a network from source to destination. In a mission-plan 
distribution, the source of the mission order is a high-level command and staff 
cell.  
The ultimate destination, though greatly parsed and modified, is the 
tactical-level unit at the lowest levels of command. In computer networking, 
queuing delay analysis is one of the most important study factors in 
communicating data. Thus, it should follow, in mission planning, that if the lowest 
level units need information as soon as possible to have time to prepare for 
upcoming missions, then the mission analysis process conducted at an 
intermediate cell is analogous to the delay incurred on a network router. 
Therefore, reducing the delay of mission distribution to subsequent units is an 
important factor in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the MDMP 
process.       
C. MESSAGE CONCEPTS 
1. Message switching 
Message switching is a networking concept in which entire messages are 
sent from a source point to a destination point through a series of intermediate 
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routing points to an edge routing node. As was later discovered, the high error 
probability and the quantity of time it took to transmit an entire message block 
from link to link caused poor utilization of a resource that eventually would be in 
high demand.  The key shortcoming, as illustrated, is that the entire message has 
to be transmitted and checked for errors and completeness before it can be 
queued for forwarding to the next node.   
2. Packet switching 
Packet switching is based on optimizing a network’s communication 
process by deconstructing a message into smaller, more manageable parts and 
transmitting each one separately on network links. Gains in efficiency are 
achieved by being able to receive a small packet, process it, and transmit 
another at the same time. For a given fixed message size, if the processing, 
queuing and transmission of message on a link takes fifteen seconds, then by 
breaking the message into five equal sections and transmitting each one 
separately, should take approximately one fifth the time.  
The packets leapfrog the network nodes in a staggered manner, 
(see Figure 3) until the last packet reaches the terminal node. The parameters 
are as follows: 
 
Pn = Number of Packets 
Pnd = Packet Nodal Delay = Mnd/Pn  
Nn = Node Count  
Mnd = Message Nodal Delay  
Md = Total Message Delay = Mnd * Nn  
Pd = Total Packet Switching Delay = (Pn +(Pn – 1))* Pnd)   
 
Figure 4: Packet switching calculation illustration 
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D. INFORMATION SHARING 
1. Information Pushing 
Information pushing is the source-initiated flow of information by planning 
staffs to lower units in the chain of command structure. It means that the lower 
units do not have to demand information and wait for communications response 
from the serving staff. More generally, it is a producer-consumer relationship in 
which the producer supply-cycle is shorter than the consumer demand cycle. The 
significance is that if the higher serving staff has information the lower staff or 
maneuver units need before the lower units asks for it then the lower level unit 
does not have to wait for the producer to produce the information; ultimately this 
means the lower-level unit does not have to wait on the higher-level units.   
Lower level command and staff groups can be well ahead of their higher level 
counterparts in obtaining information about upcoming missions.    
2. Information Pulling 
Information pulling is the opposite of information pushing. In mission 
planning activity, it is the lower-level C&S unit querying the higher-level unit for 
information concerning the upcoming mission. More generally, it is a producer-
consumer relationship where the consumer demand is greater than the producer 
can supply information.  This is more often the situation in mission planning.  
This behavior pattern in the producer-consumer relationship is expected 
and in fact should be the optimal relationship between higher and lower units. It 
means that the lower units are not overwhelmed and can process more 
information and perform more tasks. The measure of effectiveness is found in the 
amount of time the lower-level units wait, on average, for their information 
demands to be filled. In theory, the shorter the average wait, the better the 
potential performance conditions of the lower and intermediate-level unit in 
processing the information and fulfilling requests. 
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3. Information Filtering 
In recent years, the U.S. Army, like its civilian sector counterpart, has 
begun to address a phenomenon that was not an operational concern just fifteen 
years ago. Units now have to contend with the possibility of receiving too much 
information too quickly.  
Some commanders in training exercises had reported that their staffs had 
trouble giving them useful information to make timely decisions because they 
simply had too much information to process. There was no process in place to 
deal with this because some of the information yielded had never been seen 
before. Commanders and their staffs found it difficult to categorize and process 
information that they had not expected to receive.  
Commanders also found that there were no operational processes in 
place for quickly porting that information to the units they wanted to get the 
information to. Now, command and staff units are challenged with managing all 
of the sources of information, trying to make it operationally meaningful and 
leveraging it to gain a tactical or operational advantage.  
In electronic network communications, switching and routing technology 
facilitates the movement away from broadcast communications to managed 
distribution using switch-based equipment, thus reducing the footprint of the 
message as it traverses a dynamic network from source to destination.  In order 
to manage resources effectively on a network, there needs to be a mechanism in 
place to determine the destination of the message. The hardware and software 
that facilitate delivery of the message needs to be intelligent enough to customize 
routing behavior to deliver the message in a more efficient manner than 
broadcasting to every end-node that is downstream from an edge router 
associated with the intended destination node. This also means that the 
message has to contain enough information about its distribution to ensure its 
delivery. 
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E. MISSION PRODUCTS AS MESSAGES 
The same customization goal of network routing behavior can be 
extended to mission planning products that may be communicated on an 
electronic network. Using this analogy, small messages intended to be multicast 
to a small number of end users do not need to be broadcast to large numbers of 
users who have to allocate human resources toward determining that the 
message was not intended for or useful to them in the first place. 
Currently the prioritization of messages or parts of messages is the 
responsibility of the receiving command and staff unit to determine. There are 
parts of every mission order type that are not as important as other parts. This is 
not to say that the parts that are not as important do not need to be 
communicated prior to the mission execution. However, with time being one of 
the most important resources, if the message part does not affect the preparation 
actions of the receiving unit then communicating it ahead of a message part that 
does is inefficient and distracts the unit, even if for a small amount of time, from 
moving and preparing for the mission.    
1. Task Packets 
The concept of task packets centers on deconstructing messages to 
extract parts or components of a message that meet specific criteria. The test for 
determining which components need to be extracted is based on the effect it will 
have on the unit that receives it. If the receipt of the message component causes 
the unit to take some action and the action requires significant resource usage 
(such as time) then the component is a time-sensitive, task-oriented component. 
It should be sent as a high-priority, stand-alone message instead of waiting for 
other message parts to be processed.  
  
F. CLASSIFYING TASK TYPES 
‘Specified Tasks’ is an explicit category header of information that is 
usually included in Warning orders, Operations orders and Fragos. It details 
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specific operational tasks that are dictated to lower level units from higher-level 
units. Specified tasks require the receiving sub-unit to take planning and 
preparation action. These tasks are easily identifiable because they are under 
the header of mission statement, specified tasks and concept of the operation. 
‘Implied Tasks’, as their name indicates, are more difficult to identify. 
These tasks are equally as important as specified tasks as they can require 
significant planning and preparation action takes place. Therefore these tasks 
also have time sensitivity. The danger of identifying implied tasks is that there 
may be information components that do not have the same time sensitivity and 
do not specify or imply a task to be completed. However, they may affect the 
planning and preparation decisions of other message components. 
Specified and implied tasks may be part of any component or paragraph 
of any particular mission planning products. By convention rather than policy, 
they are usually found in paragraphs two and three of the mission products. 
Therefore the first place the planning staff should search for task specification is 
in these paragraphs. 
G. CLASSIFYING DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS 
Using the concepts in the preceding sections, a system designer can 
approach designing a software system to support automated message 
distribution.  First, however, the object type that the system will be managing has 
to be defined. The object is a data packet that has to be flexible enough to 
handle multiple, variable-sized cells of information.  
The object has to be homogenous enough to be managed like every other 
data object in the system. Which makes managing data records over a peer-to-
peer network more predictable. The class object also has to be as flexible or 
heterogeneous enough to allow for variable sized content within the storage 
cells. Internal content of the packets need to contain enough information such 
that if an external management system needs to retrieve information from the 
object to determine how to handle it, the function interface between the system 
and the object behaves as expected, supplying the information that differentiates 
the selected behavior.    
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A valuable view of the system design approach is to look at the object as a 
well-defined class object that is managed by an independent system process. 
The contents of the object are defined below. 
H. CONTENT 
1. Labeling 
a. Higher Mission ID  
In order to maintain the organization of the many tasks that are 
extracted from higher unit mission products, the mission that is being developed 
needs to be assigned by the developing unit. Intuitively, any subset text of a 
document that is ported from one physical or logical location, separate of the 
parent text, needs to be able to identify where it came from. A manageable local 
ID scheme can be used to identify this task such as unit, Julian-date, and another 
local number.  In short, there has to be a way to recompose decomposed 
mission products when they are transmitted in parts on a network. 
b. Mission Product Type 
Another cell of information that can communicate information to the 
receiving unit, as well as help to flag the content for storage and display 
organization, is the mission product type. The three primary types of messages 
expected to be transmitted across the network are OPERATIONS ORDERS, 
WARNING ORDERS and FRAGOS. Creating a flag that aids the application in 
identifying the original message type, simplifies the re-composition of the 
message.    
c. Paragraph 
A paragraph identifier label identifies whether or not the content 
comes from the Situation, Mission, Execution, Service Support or Command and 
Signal Paragraph. 
 54 
d.  Subparagraph Levels 1 and 2 
The paragraphs dictate which of the first level paragraph labels is 
available to select and set as the level-one marking.  The level-two subparagraph 
labels are a subset of the level one marking. Because the labels are exclusive 
sets, there should never be a conflict of labels.  Also if context-sensitive labeling 
is used, there should be no mislabeling errors. 
Labeling, as used here, only serves the purpose of attaching 
administrative notes to the labeling. There is no automated function attached to 
this note. The idea is simply to allow the transmitting unit the flexibility to explain 
any peculiarities with a particular text message. For example, a message having 
no subparagraph labels because it does not fit into the conventional format may 
need some explanation.  
e. Modifiable Flag 
An optional function flag can be coded into the application that 
restricts the receiving unit from modifying the content of a message component is 
the modifiable flag. This can be done for reasons known only to the sender, the 
receiver or both. If this function is enabled, the receiver should be made aware of 
the flag being set. The message label can be used to explain the reason for the 
modifiable flag being set. Table 2 describes the object components of a message 













Type Size Content 
HUID String Variable The Issuing Unit 
ID string two 
levels up 
UID String Variable The Issuing Unit 




Binary Flag Set Two Bits Flag set that 
determines the 
type of mission 
product the 
message part is 
for. 
ParagraphID Binary Flag Set Three Bits  
SubparLevel Binary Flag Set Two Bits  
SubParID Binary Flag Set Three Bits  
Distribution Flag Binary Flag Set 1 Bit  
Note String Variable  
Address 
Reference 
32 Bit Address of 
Distribution 
component 
4 Bytes  
Content String Variable  
Date 16 Bit Value 2 Bytes Date of Message 
Creation 
Original Message String Variable  
 
Table 2: Message format for task data record 
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2. Distribution Control 
a. Broadcast 
Controlling the network traffic has multiple benefits for the network 
resources and users of a distributed information system. Reducing the footprint 
of the communications transmission reduces the amount of waste on the 
network. Broadcasting sends every message packet to listening node on the 
network without regard for whether it is meant for their subnet. In a switch-based 
network, the communications media utilization is based on hardware addresses 
of the intended recipients. 
In mobile networking, one of the obstacles to switch-based 
networking is transmitting on mixed-media networks. Switching does not mesh 
well with air-based media. Therefore the benefit of switch-based networks is 
limited however it still has some value for reducing network traffic.  
b. Multicast recipient list 
Just as one addresses electronic mail messages, being able to 
select recipients by some distinguishing factor such as their name or unit 
identifier, has great value. This not only helps the network infrastructure to 
control the communications footprint, but also helps filter out messages that are 
not pertinent to the mission of the unit.  
3. Updating and Integrity 
a. Updating 
In order to maintain information integrity in this dynamic 
environment, mechanisms have to be inserted that allow the system to update 
itself whenever information is changed. There are two ways this can be done. 
The first is by the receiving, lower-level nodes polling the sending node for 
changes to the content or labels. If the polling node encounters modified 
postings, it automatically downloads the changed content and posts it to the 
query storage base of the receiving node. 
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The second method is to establish triggers in the sending-unit 
database that prompts the retransmission of message packets whenever the 
content or label is modified.  There is however a danger in this method that 
needs to be addressed. Transmission of the content results in transferring 
ownership of the content and the ability to modify the labels or content, to the 
receiver who may do so to meet his or her own planning requirements.  
Once a mission task is assigned, changing all but minor details of 
either the content or the label can create information management conflicts for 
the recipient of the message because they may have already modified the 
message packet to suit their needs and created document shells from their 
collection of information.  This is not much different from what occurs now in 
mission planning, although it can have further impact on the way in which 
automated information management schemes are employed. 
4. Policy and Security Issues 
a. Mission change closeout 
Because of the way mission requirements are developed, changes 
occur often, whether the mission information is developed manually or with the 
aid of an information system. Planning is not performed in a vacuum. However to 
the personnel who react to the changes in requirements it sometimes appears as 
if the planning staff is unaware of how much execution task changes impact the 
lower level receiving unit’s preparation tasks. Regardless of how the information 
is developed, there has to be a cutoff point for changes to mission requirements. 
This is not a technology issue but a leadership-awareness issue.   
b. Document closeout 
Related to the mission change closeout is document closeout. 
Planning staffs spend a great deal of effort to produce mission documents and 
yet changes even to production mission orders is an open-ended concern. This is 
another policy and leadership awareness concern. Receiving-unit leaders make 
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decisions with great impact based on the belief that the documents they have in 
hand are the way the mission will be executed. Concerns about open-ended 
changes create apprehension and anxiety among subordinate leaders that the 
plans they develop are not the tasks that are going to be executed. This may 
result in the soldiers that they lead having less confidence in the plans. 
Documents must be closed out at a reasonable time window prior to mission 
execution to allow leaders and soldiers to gain confidence in the plans they are 
supposed to execute. 
5. Security of Equipment and Information 
Security of the equipment that facilitates information management 
warrants the type of security that applies to encryption devices and secure 
tactical radios common in Army vehicles and planning environments. This is 
mentioned as an obligatory note, in order that the reader can be aware that any 
proposed automated information management infrastructure can become a 
valuable, intangible asset to the unit utilizing it, and also to enemy forces who 


























In this chapter we introduce requirements for automated data sharing 
systems that support the processing of information passed by higher-level 
commands to tactical-level units. 
2. Overview  
The original concept driving the study is a peer-to-peer dynamic data 
sharing application. An example of a well-known peer-to-peer application, 
Napster®, which permitted had allowed music aficionados to share downloaded 
music with each other. The idea is that if one user has possession of a data 
object in an indexed file, then anyone can acquire it, provided that both of the 
users are logically associated with the same network. The application acts as a 
catalog of objects, a symmetric, distributed application, and a data management 
system interface application.  
Based on this paradigm, each node/user is responsible for managing their 
own data and controlling who can or cannot access it. For converting the concept 
for military operational use, the object in question is a labeled task message 
stored as a data record instead of a music file. Additional functionality provides 
the user with the capability for organizing, controlling redistribution, sorting, and 
converting to mission documents.   
B. BUSINESS CONTEXT 
Assuming that there is an adequate argument to place automated 
planning tools in the hands of lower level tactical planning personnel, the most 
direct way to generate user requirements is to create a user scenario that maps 
software requirements to operational needs. A software requirements framework 
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can be used by developers to focus on the requirements of the proposed data-
management application, which generates system and subsystem functions that 
they can transform into a software architecture for a design-engineering project 
to develop the application.  







































Figure 5: Application architecture model  
a. Product Functions 
The general functions of the product are to manage tactical data 
objects to facilitate task-level object sharing between users, as peer-to-peer 
clients within a client-server, managed environment. The components of the 
system, viewed as self-contained, integrated components that export functions to 
other parts of the application, are the application component, the graphical user 
interface (GUI) component and the data management component. 
b. Application Component  
The application component’s core function is to take user requests 
and translate them into function calls that interface with both the data 
management system and the instance data records that the system manages. If 
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necessary, the system must autonomously negotiate network connections with 
peer nodes in order to acquire messages and append them to a temporary data 
store. This implies a requirement for a set of interfaces that manage the 
information that is used to support the core function of the application.  
Using the preceding example, automating the network connections 
implies managing the network configuration data store that facilitates component-
to-component interaction to resolve the network addresses of needed 
information. Additional configuration interfaces include sub-unit identifications, 
task organization structures that can enhance the interaction between the user 
and the system.   
c. Interface Component 
The graphic interface manages how the user interacts with the 
applications and data records.  The high-level functions of the GUI are designed 
to manage the user’s authentication and configuration, mission configuration, 
network configuration, passwords, along with facilitate data acquisition, 
document management, and security administration. 
d. Data Management Component 
Data management goals are to integrate two or more database 
tables across specific missions. There are two message boards that the data 
management component controls; the temporary table and the local posting 
table. This component is also concerned with querying other data tables for 
pertinent messages. 
The temporary data record table is used for modifying content or 
labels, and selecting messages for posting to the local posting table. An 
additional function of the data management component is to set distribution 
requirements for each message.  Here, the data management component can 
interface with the task organization management component to select from a list 
of sub-units that should receive the listed message. Part of the query function’s 
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requirements is to check the distribution list and flag authorized messages before 
transmitting them. Only flagged messages are authorized be transmitted. 
The network connection list allows the data management 
component, and more specifically the data acquisition function, to dynamically 
select which database the user chooses to acquire message data from. This 
function is independent of the appropriateness of the authority to access the data 
messages. Authorization should be handled by different components.  
Functionality within the data management component should allow the user to 
dynamically change the address reference of the peer node to another address, 
considering the dynamic environment.  
e. Data Engine 
The data engine manages the interaction between the application 
and the data it manages for the user. It needs be able to access remote postings, 
a local, temporary data store and the local distribution data store.     
One of the application’s functional needs is to query database 
indexes for message postings. The interface should allow the user to select the 
messages he or she wants to download from the list of posted available 
messages, and post the messages to a temporary storage area.  
Once the remote postings are selected and saved to the local 
temporary store, data functionality should allow the modification of the data 
contents and labels, which effectively changes the automated decision as to how 
the information will be displayed.  
f.  Data Conversion 
The data conversion component interacts with the local temporary 
table to recompose selected messages into a mission document framework. The 
intent of the labels of the message blocks is to aid in the determination of the 
message type and sorting of the order of the message. 
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D. USER CHARACTERISTICS 
This application is targeted towards two potential groups of primary users 
within the combat arms community. The enlisted service members of the United 
States U.S. Army, ranking between private and sergeant, with two to eight years 
of service are the first group. This user group is young, comfortable with 
computer technology in general and familiar with applications that feature a menu 
driven, GUI environment.  
This group is also knowledgeable of the current generation of commercial 
software products and communications hardware and software, such as Ethernet 
and TCP/IP. They are familiar with the current office productivity suites, like 
Microsoft Office 2000® and can usually troubleshoot simple-to-fix operating 
system, device drivers and hardware problems.  
The second group is the junior officer group, ranking between second 
lieutenant and captain. This group is also young and has between one and eight 
years of service, a similar knowledge base as the junior enlisted service 
members and some have bachelor degrees in science and engineering 
disciplines. Most will have been required, in undergraduate schooling, to use 
computer technology to fulfill education requirements.    
For both of these groups, automation and information management are an 
accepted part of their environments. They are unaware of a world in which 
computer technology and information are not available to them. They believe that 
most problems can be solved as long as they have the technology to acquire 
information.   
E. USER PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The automation environment is not mature for lower level tactical units. 
The computer resources are available and generally meet the performance 
requirements for current software technology needs. The network operating 
system (NOS) environment is stable and robust enough to support peer-sharing 
applications. However, the software development process has catered to high-
level units to the detriment of the lower level units.   
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Lower-level tactical users do not have adequate data management 
software technology to acquire, manage and redistribute data using the available 
hardware technology. The information processing capabilities are limited and 
unreliable. Managing these processing tasks takes more man-hours than most 
units have available to allocate to it.    
F. USER OBJECTIVES 
The user’s high-level objectives are to create accurate and relevant 
mission products in a timely manner, using acquired or created task data 
records. Additionally, changing requirements dictate that the system needs to be 
flexible to process changes.  
If an automation application is used to aid in the mission development 
process, then it must also be flexible to changes. 
The user wants to save time and resources, so that the resources can be 
allocated to other preparation tasks. 
G. GENERAL CONSTRAINTS 
• Any system designed for use by service members in the field must be a 
menu-driven application. 
• The configuration functions that associate the user to an established 
network must be intuitive, and easily located and executed. 
• Critical configuration functions must be semi-autonomous. Applets that 
assist the user in configuring or reconfiguring critical services should be 
made available.    
H. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The functional requirements list the user or application events that the 
application must execute. The following is an initial listing. 
 
1. Convert data to mission document; The purpose of the application is to 
decompose large documents into smaller messages for timely transmission. The 
terminal goal is to be able to recompose the messages into documents.  
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2. Save Mission documents; Application management function.  
3. Load Mission Documents; Meet requirement to retrieve saved documents 
for review and printing.  
4. Connect to peer nodes; The user must be allowed to dynamically modify 
the connections.  
5. View Peer Nodes; Allows user to determine what nodes he has 
configuration data for.  
6. Create mission data; This user function is essential to the purpose of the 
application.  
7. Delete local data records; The user needs to select from a list of data 
records which ones to delete.  
8. Modify local data; The user needs to select individual data records to 
modify.  
9. Post local data; Allows user to set distribution information for local data  
10. Save data records; Allows user to save data records separate of the 
mission documents. Data can be retrieved at a later date.  
11. Set Distribution; Allows user to set distribution information for local data  
12. View Local Data; This user function is essential to the purpose of the 
application.  
13. Add messages to local post; A select function must exist as part of the 
view remote data function. An add function reviews the add flags and adds the 
selected messages to the local posting board.  
14. Challenge and authenticate local users; There must be a 'run once' 
process that allows the initialization of a user before the first use of the 
application.  
15. Add local users; Initial user can add other users. Users should be able to 
manage their own files but not other users.  
16. Delete local users; Initial user can delete other users. Application should 
query user for disposition of saved files.  
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17. Add remote data to local storage; A select function must exist as part of 
the view local data function. A delete function reviews the delete flags and 
removes the selected messages.  
18. View Peer Data Posting; The user must be able to connect and 
authenticate himself to a peer node. The remote system checks the users right 
against a distribution list for each task and downloads for viewing only those 
messages that meet the criteria.  
19. Add remote users; The application must maintain a list of active, 
authorized users and passwords. When a remote user attempts to connect to a 
local user's posting board, the application checks the list prior to accepting the 
connecction. An appropriate authentication response should be sent to the 
sending node if a connection attempt is rejected.  
20. Challenge and authenticate remote users; The application must maintain a 
list of active, authorized users and passwords. This allows the local user control 
of who logs on and off of the machine.  
21. Delete remote users; The local user must be able to view a list of remote 
connections and user, select connections to disconnect.  
22. Select and download peer data; Once data is downloaded for viewing, the 
user must select the data messeges he wants to append to his local posting 
board. 
I. INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS  
1. Graphical User Interface 
 The GUI requirement established for this implementation is based on the 
Windows Application Programming Interface environment. A window-based 
interface guides and directs the user to high-level user functions of the 
application. The major functions of the system are accessed as a list of 
component menu items, which make function calls to the application components 
and operating system. See Figure for component organization associated with 
the interface organization. 
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2. Application Programming Interface 
The Application Programming Interface (API) target for a Windows-based 
implementation should be Windows 2000/XP platform APIs. By targeting the 
leading edge of the software technology, developers have some lead-time for 
integrating the application into the tactical computing base.  
3. Communications Interfaces  
The system should have full compatibility with the Internet. System 
developers can assume that complex communications configuration issues 
cannot be solved quickly or effectively in a tactical environment.  Developers 
should also be mindful of the unique challenges of a tactical operating 
environment. Critical to the success of a design implementation in this 
environment, will be the ease with which the user can shutdown, restart and re-
associate with peer nodes.      
4. Software Interfaces 
In addition to making system calls to the operating system through the 
application-programming interface, the networking suite may reference a local or 
network-based naming service, depending on how node addresses are resolved 
in a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) environment.  
J. DESIGN CONSTRAINTS 
1. Standards Compliance 
The communications protocols external behavior must comply with open 
standards. Currently, the U.S. Army uses two standards for communications, 
X.25 and Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The trend is 
toward developing with TCP/IP for most applications because it is an open 
standard. The use of TCP/IP creates a security concern because of compatibility 
with current civilian standards.   
 69 
2. Hardware Limitations 
Current hardware limitations are based on the expected average hardware 
platform in the field. The application should be targeted toward the current 
capabilities of desktop workstations or ruggedized notebook platforms, with 
abundant storage capacity, an Ethernet type connection and possibly a USB or 
PCMCIA adapter for wireless connectivity.  
K. OTHER NON-FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Security 
Considering the proposed usage and the sensitivity of the information 
being exchanged, security warrants equal consideration as every other design 
issue. Security of the operational data as it is transmitted and security of the user 
authentication data are top-level design issues.   
2. Reliability 
System reliability is key to acceptance of automated applications. The 
ability to recover from errors and system downtime is very important to the 
application’s perceived reliability.  
3. Maintainability 
The application should be learnable and maintainable by the application’s 
user. Consideration should be given to using script files that make the application 
easy to install, configure, maintain and troubleshoot. File and directory 
conventions should be designed to ensure that the file paths are found by the 
application without frequent intervention by the user.   
4. Portability 
It is a possible that the application may need to be ported to another 
operating system environment. The application architecture as currently 
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proposed does not support ease of portability. One option, a web based 
interface, improves portability tremendously. The cost of doing this, however, 
may be losing functionality options that are unique to the proprietary 
environments such as Windows and Linux.  
5. Extensibility 
The application must be designed with extensibility in mind. There are 
planned improvements mentioned in the summary that can potentially take 
advantage of specialization for existing application classes that support the 
application. 
6. Reusability 
The components of the application should be designed with reuse as a 
consideration. The application components are design to support the objectives 
of the user within the application framework that is proposed. However, 
components may be accessed through well-defined interfaces for product 
improvements. 
7. Application Affinity/Compatibility 
The application should be compatible with the Windows API or with one of 
the common web browsers if using a markup language for designing an 
interface, because the most common OS environment the United States U.S. 
Army service members is familiar with is the series of Windows OS environments 
and most.  
There is a trend developing in the Unix/Linux communities to develop 
applications, and a standard application-programming interface for Linux 
Products. If this trend continues and the U.S. Army desired to port the application 
to a Linux environment, there will be considerable work to redesign the 
application. This is a design risk. 
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8. Serviceability 
The software application and the hardware platform containing it must be 
serviceable by trained U.S. Army personnel. The software serviceability is related 
to its reliability.  
L. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
A scenario for developing a use case involves the user logging into the 
application by identifying himself and authenticating his identity with a password. 
The system keeps track of the files, and possibly the operating system, will 
display the files the user has access to. The user either creates a local data file 
or selects a previously created local file. The mission identifier and label are set 
when the file is read into memory. The user selects the file he wants to load.  
 The user may select to display the messages in the local temporary data 
store or attempt to acquire new messages from a selected peer node and 
append them to the same store. The user chooses to check a peer node for new 
messages and selects the peer node. The application queries the node and 
returns to the requesting system a response by showing the messages that are 
authorized for distribution. The user selects the messages he wants to save and 
appends these queries to the temporary store and closes out of the query applet.  
The user returns to the display and begins to modify each message label 
or data cell as needed and then saves the messages to a temporary storage file. 
Once the temporary data is stored, the user can opt to select messages to be 
posted to a distribution list or convert the data to a document.  
If the user opts to convert the data to a document, the document is saved 
as a word-processing document that is associated with a data storage file.  If the 
user decides to post the messages to a distribution list, the user selects the 
distribution applet, which displays the temporary messages. The user selects 
each message and cycles through the distribution options, which associate 
distribution flags with each message. The user can then post the messages and 
continue to manage the data. Figure 5 shows the high-level interaction between 
the user and the application interface.  
 72 
P e e r  D a ta
S h a r in g  S y s te m
S ta f f  O p e ra t io n s  D e v e lo p e r /U s e r
In it ia liz e
A p p lic a t io n
M a n a g e  M is s io n
T a s k s
In it ia liz e  N e tw o rk
In it ia liz e  M is s io n
A d m in is te r  A c c e s s
M a n a g e  D o c u m e n t
S h e ll
M a n a g e  U n it  D a ta
 
Figure 6: User interface model 
M. SOFTWARE COMPONENTS 
Figure 4 identifies the software components from which the functions of 
the system identified. The functions below the components refer to the 






N. FUNCTIONS LISTING 
The functions listed in Table 3 are derived from the functional 
requirements stated in paragraph H, of this chapter. The list of functions matches 
the user’s operational processes with application requirements.  
 
Public Function: matchAuthentication() 
Menu Item:  
Interface Menu: Application Initilization Trigger 
Navigation:  
Interface: Administration to password check function  
Public Function: getFile() 
Menu Item: Open 
Interface Menu: File Management Interface 
Navigation: File 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function  
Public Function: saveFile() 
Menu Item: Save 
Interface Menu: File Management Interface 
Navigation: File 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function  
Public Function: saveFileAs() 
Menu Item: Save As 
Interface Menu: File Management Interface 
Navigation: File 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function  
Public Function: newFile() 
Menu Item: New 
Interface Menu: File Management Interface 
Navigation: File 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function  
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Public Function: printFile() 
Menu Item: Print 
Interface Menu: File Management Interface 
Navigation: File 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function  
Public Function: closeMission() 
Menu Item: Close 
Interface Menu: File Management Interface 
Navigation: File 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function  
Public Function: ExitApp() 
Menu Item: Exit 
Interface Menu: File Management Interface 
Navigation: File 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function  
Public Function: initMission() 
Menu Item: Create Mission 
Interface Menu: Mission Management Interface 
Navigation: Mission 
Interface: Function call to Mission Management component to initialize mission 
variables  
Public Function: getMission() 
Menu Item: Load Mission Data 
Interface Menu: Mission Management Interface 
Navigation: Mission 
Interface: Application component system call to an Operating System function to 
read mission variables into application from data file.  
Public Function: saveMissionDat() 
Menu Item: Save Mission Data 
Interface Menu: Mission Management Interface 
Navigation: Mission 
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Interface: File Management system call to an Operating System function to write 
mission variables into data file from current mission information.  
Public Function: saveMissionDatAs() 
Menu Item: Save Mission Data As 
Interface Menu: Mission Management Interface 
Navigation: Mission 
Interface: File Management system call to an Operating System function to write 
mission variables into data file from current mission information.  
Public Function: showOutConnections() 
Menu Item: View Local Connections 
Interface Menu: Network Connection Interface: Local Connections List 
Navigation: Network 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: createSocket() 
Menu Item: Add Peer Connection 
Interface Menu: Network Connection Interface: Local Connections List 
Navigation: Network 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: deleteSocket() 
Menu Item: Delete Peer Connection 
Interface Menu: Network Connection Interface: Local Connections List 
Navigation: Network 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: showInConnections() 
Menu Item: Show Remote Connections 
Interface Menu: Network Connection Interface: Remote Connections List 
Navigation: Network 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: networkConfig() 
Menu Item: Configure Local Connection 
Interface Menu: Network Interface: Local Configuration Interface 
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Navigation: Network 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: addRemUser() 
Menu Item: Add Remote Users 
Interface Menu: User Manger: Remote Users Tab 
Navigation: Users 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: delRemUser() 
Menu Item: Delete Remote Users 
Interface Menu: User Manger: Remote Users Tab 
Navigation: Users 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: showRemUsers() 
Menu Item: List Remote Users 
Interface Menu: User Manger: Remote Users Tab 
Navigation: Users 
Interface: Function Call to Network Management Component  
Public Function: addLocalUser() 
Menu Item: Add LocalUsers 
Interface Menu: User Manager: Local Users Tab 
Navigation: Users 
Interface: Function Call to User Manager Component  
Public Function: delLocalUser() 
Menu Item: Delete Local Users 
Interface Menu: User Manager: Local Users Tab 
Navigation: Users 
Interface: Function Call to User Manager Component  
Public Function: showLocalUser() 
Menu Item: View Users 
Interface Menu: User Manager: Local Users Tab 
Navigation: Users 
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Interface: Function Call to User Manager Component  
Public Function: showLocalData() 
Menu Item: View Local Data 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Local Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
Public Function: modifyLocalData() 
Menu Item: Modify Local Data 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Local Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
Public Function: postData() 
Menu Item: Post Local Data 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Local Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
Public Function: setDistr() 
Menu Item: Set Distribution 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Local Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
Public Function: viewPostList() 
Menu Item: View Post 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Local Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
Public Function: setPeerQuerySelect() 
Menu Item: Peer to Query 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Remote Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
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Public Function: queryRemote() 
Menu Item: View Remote Data 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Remote Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
Public Function: saveSelData() 
Menu Item: Select and Save Remote Data 
Interface Menu: Data Management Interface: Remote Data Tab 
Navigation: Data Manager 
Interface: Function Call to Data Manager  
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VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
In this thesis we assess the need for providing automated application 
solutions for use by the U.S. Army for mission planning and preparation for low-
level tactical units. The scope of the assessment is limited to how leaders and 
staff officers at each echelon of command below division-level pass information 
to lower echelons of the units at each level.  
An analysis of the technological environment shows that the U.S. Army 
has the computer hardware, software and networking capability to support 
networked peer applications to facilitate data sharing. The current and future 
generations of soldiers are comfortable with and understand the technological 
environment much better than past generations.  
Analysis of U.S. Army organizational structure illustrates that mission 
planning and development is complex. Its complexity grows as the size, type and 
number of units grows with the preparation for each mission. Additionally, the 
probability of mission planning and preparation errors grows.     
B. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Army continuously conducts successful combat and combat 
support missions around the world. One of the reasons for the operational 
successes is our combat leaders’ understanding of battlefield dynamics, such as 
time and space.  Time is a critical resource and if managed well can yield an 
advantage over an adversary. 
The public expects the U.S. Army to execute very difficult missions with 
few errors and few casualties. This creates an environment in which leaders will 
incorporate any technology that will give them an operational advantage. If the 
Army invests in automated mission planning and development applications for 
tactical units below brigade level, then it is possible that the return will be a 
mission preparation time advantage in the form of better execution results from 
the tactical units.   
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Movement 
The orderly movement of large tactical units from one location to another 
is an immense task. As a product improvement, a tool that would have value to 
tactical planners is an automated applet that can take a list of vehicles, a set of 
time and distance parameters, and calculate movement order data. Movement 
orders were not mentioned in this thesis because they are not considered to be a 
core mission-planning product. Tactical movement is, however, a significant 
event.     
2. Data Portability 
Data portability was not discussed in this thesis. However, the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) is concerned about information reuse, information 
integration, and synergy. One of the approaches the DoD has pushed for in the 
past has been a universal standard for data-format properties. This has turned 
out to be a very large task because there are so many data items already in use, 
each with their own semantics and properties.  Along these lines, one should 
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